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Abstract
Investigation of criminal offenses is becoming increasingly associated with the use 
of information in electronic form. Electronic evidence becomes an integral part of the nor-
mative basis of criminal proceeding. The article is devoted to the comparative legal 
study of the use of information from electronic media in criminal proceeding of several 
European states. First, the experience of “classical” states of the continental legal system 
(France, Germany, and Italy) was highlighted. Further, the study of the Baltic region 
states experience was carried out in relation to each of the states not in isolation, but 
according to the most favorable structure for comparison. After that some general trends 
and the most striking problems with the subject were shown. General conclusions related 
both to signs of electronic evidence and to the most demanded procedural mechanisms 
for obtaining such data were made.
Keywords: comparative criminal process, electronic evidence, electronic informa-
tion, investigative actions.
Introduction
Development of information technology greatly affects all spheres of public life. 
Criminal justice is not an exception. Regulated sources of evidence and procedural tools 
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for their reception can no longer ignore the enormous amount of electronic data con-
taining unique information for crime disclosure. At the same time, each legal system 
adapts to modern conditions in different ways.
In view of the similarity of the  legal systems elements within the Romano-
Germanic (continental) legal family, the comparative legal study of the states belonging 
to it is especially valuable. The choice of individual states is due to the following reasons: 
1) the legal systems of France, Federal Republic of Germany and Italy traditionally belong 
to the same group or legal family [7, 116–117]; 2) the legal systems of the Baltic region 
countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), having undergone the long-term influence of 
the socialist system, nevertheless, have made significant progress in the implementation 
of human rights standards, in particular in criminal proceeding. 1
Given the objective complexity of forming a systemic view of electronic evidence 
in the criminal proceeding of foreign countries solely on the basis of the primary mate-
rial (including considering the language barrier), the primary sources of information 
(regulations and practice), and modern works of scientists of the respective states have 
become the benchmarks in the comparative study.
The algorithm of foreign experience study is compiled according to the most expe-
dient, in our opinion, sequence: 1) legal regulation; 2) the place of electronic evidence in 
the system of evidence sources; 3) problematic issues of observance of human rights and 
freedoms; 4) public and secret investigative actions that can provide electronic evidence 
obtaining. In the study of foreign experience, the priority is given to legal regulations 
with the addition of useful provisions of judicial practice.
Based on the study of foreign experience, we have formed conclusions with 
the simultaneous identification of general trends and the most pressing problems of 
electronic evidence use in the field of criminal justice in order to lay the groundwork for 
further scientific research in the given direction.
Experience of “classical” states of 
the continental legal family
France
The Criminal Procedure Legislation of the French Republic does not contain 
the concept of electronic evidence or digital evidence. Instead, the French criminal justice 
authorities identify several aspects related to digital data and their use in law enforcement. 
Each aspect follows from the relevant regulatory framework: (1) Postal and 
Electronic Communications Code (Code des Postes et des communications électroniques) 
identifies obligations relevant to Internet service providers vis-à-vis individual users and 
 1 For example, Estonia’s high position in the ranking of states under the rule of law index can serve 
as confirmation. (https://gtmarket.ru/research/rule-of-law-index/info).
Socrates RSU elektroniskais juridisko zinātnisko rakstu žurnāls 2019, Nr. 3 (15)
— 10 —
Andrii Skrypnyk, Ivan Titko. Use of Information from Electronic Media in Criminal   
Proceeding of Several European States: Comparative Legal Research
public authorities; (2) Criminal Code (Code pénal) defines crimes and offences committed 
against or through the use of information and communication systems; (3) Criminal 
Procedure Code (Code de procedure pénale) frames the legal requirements for digital 
evidence collection; (4) Internal Security Code (Code de la sécurité intérieure) defines 
how intelligence agencies can collect information and data for the purpose of maintaining 
security and countering terrorism [11, 15–16].
The French Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the FCCP) 
provides the possibility to use criminal evidence in information and communication 
systems (Art. 94 of the FCCP). 
At the same time there is a differentiation of procedural order of access to: (elec-
tronic communications; digital data, [11, 17; 2, 277] in particular:
 a) regarding the electronic form of communication, the procedural law determines, 
firstly, the conditions under which law enforcement authorities may initiate 
the interception of communicative information (Article 100-100-7 of the FCCP), 
and secondly, the list of data that can be obtained (Article 706-95-706-95-10). 
The specification of the mentioned procedural rules was found in the Postal 
and Electronic Communications Code, which obliges Internet service providers: 
(1) to collect and store communication data for one year, the list of which is 
exhaustive (Art. L34-1, R10-13 of the FCCP); (2) to provide such information to 
law enforcement authorities only for the purpose of a criminal investigation, and 
only in the case of a request [11, 17–18]. The refusal to provide data on request 
results in fine imposition [2, 276];
 b) in general terms, procedural regulation of digital data obtaining is as follows. 
Firstly, the French investigation authorities are authorised to implement a tech-
nical device, capable of recording, storing and transmitting information to 
the relevant authorities, to the information system of the user without his con-
sent (Art. 706-102-1 of the FCCP) [11, 17]. The term dispositif technique used 
in this rule covers a large variety of tools, but it is mostly related to Trojans. 
Such procedural action can only be carried out by permission of the court to 
investigate crimes that, according to the qualifications of the European Court 
of Human Rights, may be attributed to serious criminal activity [3]. Secondly, 
in proceedings concerning a separate category of crimes, the possibility of 
decrypting data protected by information security systems is foreseen, subject 
to prior permission of the prosecutor or the court (Art.230-1-230-5 of the FCCP) 
[3]. Thirdly, law enforcement agencies are authorised to gain access to geo-
graphical localisation of any object deemed relevant to criminal investigations 
(Art. 230-32-230-44 of the FCCP) [3].
Thus, the French legislation covers the full range of possible cases of obtaining 
and using digital evidence, with the simultaneous installation of information security 
guarantees introduced in the Act on Information Technology, Data and Civil Liberties 
in 1978 [21].
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Germany
Legal basis of electronic form of evidence-based information use in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (hereinafter – Germany) makes up the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung) (hereinafter – the GCCP) [13], certain provisions 
of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act) (Bundeskriminalamtgesetz) [14], the Tele-
communica tions Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz) [25]. Similar to the FCCP, the GCCP, 
although not using or reinforcing the concept of electronic evidence or digital evidence, 
contains provisions that can be applied to information in electronic form, especially in 
terms of its defense during the investigation [20, 27]. For example, such standards include: 
the prohibition on seizure of written communications or any information about them if 
their holder has the right to refuse to testify (Sec. 1 Par. 97 of the GCCP); the prohibition 
on seizure of audio recordings, image recordings, information, photographs and other 
works owned by journalists and the media (Sec. 5 Par. 97 of the GCCP) [13]. 
Investigating procedural tools, we should touch the coverage of the constitutional 
aspect, especially in terms of human rights and freedoms observance. Thus, the body of 
constitutional control of Germany, on the basis of the systematic combination of two con-
stitutional values: human dignity (Art. 1 of the German Basic Law) and self-development 
(freedom) of an individual (Par. 1 Art. 2 of the German Basic Law), has developed a new 
concept of the right to privacy in the digital space. In its decision, the court named it as 
the right to the guarantee of the integrity and confidentiality of information technology 
systems [11, 36]. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany noted that the secret 
access to the information and technology system, which consists in actions monitoring 
of the system user or information reading, can be considered valid only in the presence 
of factual data on the threat to the protected interests of higher, compared with pri-
vate, priority level [17]. Thus, the constitutional control body of Germany has extended 
the legal protection of guarantee of the right to privacy of correspondence, postal items 
and telecommunications (Art. 10 of the German Basic Law), extending its validity and 
information generated and stored on electronic devices [11, 36].
In the context of collecting information from electronic media, the public tools are: 
(1) seizure (Sec. 94-98 of the GCCP); (2) automated comparison and transfer of personal 
data (Sec. 98-98c of the GCCP); (3) request for receiving telecommunication information 
stored by telecommunication service providers (Sec. 100g, 100j of the GCCP); (4) inspec-
tion of documents and electronic media (Sec. 110 of the GCCP). 
The most striking features of these actions are as follows: 
 a) seizure may concern items that can be relevant to the investigation as evidence, 
in particular computer files and e-mails [15, 139]. The GCCP does not link 
the possibility of the seizure with a certain degree of severity of the investigated 
offence. At the same time, according to the general rule, such procedural action 
can be carried out on the basis of a court ruling, and only in urgent cases – 
the decisions of the prosecutor or the investigator on his behalf (Par. 1 Sec. 98 
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of the GCCP). The specificity of the seizure is that it can only relate to infor-
mation that is on electronic media, which was previously obtained or created, 
and then only stored. In the case of the transmission of this information by 
communication channels, its collection should be carried out within the con-
trol of telecommunications (Sec. 100a of the GCCP), which is already a secret 
investigative action [15, 57–58];
 b) automated comparison and transmission of personal data are based on obtaining 
and automated processing of personal data bases carried out in order to establish 
the circle of persons who have important characteristic features for the further 
investigation (Par. 1 Sec. 98а of the GCCP). In the context of our research, at least 
three aspects of such investigative action deserve attention. Firstly, the estab-
lishment of a requirement regarding the gravity and nature of the criminal 
offence under investigation (Par. 1 Sec. 98a of the GCCP); secondly, the conduct 
of an action using automated information systems (Sec. 98c of the GCCP); thirdly, 
the obligation to return the electronic media to disposers after the end of the data 
comparison and to delete the copied information (Par. 3 Sec. 98b of the GCCP); 
 c) request for receiving telecommunication information stored by telecom-
munica tion service providers may relate to information about subscribers of 
telecommunication services (Sec. 111, 113 of the Telecommunications Law 
(Tele kommunikationsgesetz)) [25] – according to Sec. 100j of the GCCP, or 
telecommuni cation services provided (Sec. 113b of the Telecommunications 
Law) [25] – according to Sec. 100g of the GCCP. At the same time, such request 
may not relate to: the data related to the use of e-mail; the data held by over-
the-top massaging providers [11, 34];
 d) inspection of documents and electronic media (Par. 1 Sec. 110 of the GCCP) 
is possible only concerning the documents found during the search. Although 
this article does not contain general rules for carrying out the inspection of 
electronic media, there is a special rule devoted to the remote inspection in 
Par. 3. According to this rule, if there is a threat of stored data loss, it is allowed 
to conduct an inspection of an electronic medium that does not have physical 
access, but is available virtually (for example, via a local network).
The tools for secret investigative actions are more diverse. For example, telecom-
munications control (Sec. 100a, 100b of the GCCP) may be implemented using spe-
cially designed software – Bundestrojaner (Quellen-Telekommunikationsuberwachung). 
The specified Trojan programme is not directly foreseen by the GCCP, but it is “legalised” 
through the provisions of the Federal Criminal Police Act (Sec. 51) [14] as a preventive 
measure against terrorist threats. The value of such software is the ability to track and 
record all kinds of real-time electronic communications (such as Skype, instant mes-
saging, e-mails) even before their encryption [11, 30–31]. And it greatly increases the event 
efficiency and the reliability of its results. However, the question of the admissibility of 
evidence obtained using such a Trojan programme (under the so-called online search) 
is ambiguous in German law enforcement practice [2, 267; 11, 31; 15, 167]. 
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Italy
The use of information from electronic media in the criminal proceeding in Italy is 
based on the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (Сodice di procedura penale) (hereinafter 
referred to as the ICCP), and in some aspects of the Personal Data Protection Code (Codice 
in materia di protezione dei dati personali) [10] and the Electronic Communications 
Code (Codice delle comunicazioni elettroniche) [9]. Similar to the regulations of France 
and Germany, Italian criminal procedure legislation does not distinguish “electronic” or 
“digital evidence” as an independent procedural source.
The ICCP provides procedural tools for evidence collecting from electronic media 
including the following procedural actions: inspection (Art. 244); search, including “dig-
ital” one (cl. 1-bis Art. 244, cl. 1-bis Art. 352); seizure of electronic data (Art. 254-bis); 
recording and seizure of information in urgent cases (Art. 354). 
Their features are considered further:
 a) the ICCP does not provide for a separate type of inspection, the object of which 
is electronic media. However, in the case of information or telecommunication 
systems, it is envisaged that technical measures should be taken to ensure that 
the data are unaltered (for example, by disconnecting from a global or local 
network) [9];
 b) regarding the search, the ICCP distinguishes a special kind, the object of which 
may be electronic media of information, such as digital data, software or other 
“electronic” traces (cl. 1-bis Art. 247). Such a search is called a “digital” one in 
the scientific literature [11, 45]. It is conducted on a motivated permission, if 
there are reasons to believe that information necessary for the investigation is 
contained in the information or telecommunication system. At the same time, 
the person who conducts a “digital” search is responsible for taking technical 
measures aimed at ensuring the integrity of stored data [8]. 
 c) the electronic data seizure (Art. 254-bis of the ICCP), which is specifically 
designed to collect evidence from digital sources, is based on the seizure of data 
from information, telematic and telecommunication service providers. In this 
case, a particular attention is paid to maintaining the authenticity of the data 
received. Thus, the originality of digital data should be provided both by pro-
viders during collection and storage and by the investigating authorities when 
copying on electronic media (Art. 254-bis of the ICCP) [8]. It is noteworthy that 
the range of providers obliged to provide “mandatory services” does not include 
over-the-top massaging providers and information society services providers 2 
 2 This refers to the services regulated by Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Srvices, in par-
ticular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) [See 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Srvices, in particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal 
Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’). Official Journal of the European Union (L 178) 17 July 
2000. Available from: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/31/oj [Accessed 29 November 2019]. 
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(for example, Google, Facebook, Skype, etc.) [11, 44]. That is why, according 
to the described situation, it is advisable not to conduct a seizure, but to apply 
a mechanism for collecting digital documents and computer data stored abroad 
(Art. 234-bis of the ICCP); 
 d) fixing and seizure of information in urgent cases, as one of the urgent inspection 
types (Art. 354 of the ICCP), are, first of all, of a preventive nature. Their conduct 
is allowed in the presence of a real threat of destruction or alteration of evi-
dentiary information (digital data, computer programs, and other information 
from computer or telecommunication systems). The features of this extraordi-
nary investigative action are that it can be carried out: before the beginning of 
the investigation; by police officers who are not investigators (cl. 2 Art. 344 of 
the ICCP). At the same time, the police have three main responsibilities: 1) to 
take all possible measures to keep the information unchanged and to prevent 
access to it; 2) in the presence of technical capability, to copy the information 
to the electronic media; 3) if necessary, to remove the electronic media [8].
The tools for secret investigative actions in Italian procedural law are consistent 
with the traditional one: an interception of conversations (Art. 266 of the ICCP), an inter-
ception of computer or telematic communications (Art. 266-bis of the ICCP), a sei-
zure of correspondence, including electronic (Art. 353 of the ICCP) and so on. Given 
the limited scope of the article, we will try to focus on highlighting only one, but in 
our opinion, the most problematic aspect is the use of Trojan programs for electronic 
evidence obtaining [11, 47]. Trojan programmes are a type of malware that appears to 
be harmless and deceives the user in order to stimulate an active conduct that will result 
in its installation on the target computer system [26, 88]. The ICCP does not directly 
regulate the legitimacy of the Trojan programmes use during the criminal investigation. 
At the same time, the possibility of using malware can follow from a number of provi-
sions of the law [1, 8–13]. 
Attempts to resolve regulatory uncertainty have been made by the Italian Supreme 
Court of Cassation and have been consolidated in a number of decisions on this issue. 
The position of the court can be conditionally grouped in the following way:
 a) there is no secret observation when using Trojans. This conclusion follows from 
the fact that the investigation body’s actions consist solely in the removal and 
duplication of information stored on the hard disk. That is, the seizure is not 
any “flow of communications”, but “only an operational relationship between 
the microprocessor and video of the electronic system” (Italian Supreme Court 
of Cassation, Division V, Decision № 24695, of 14 October 2009) [26, 91];
 b) the above position, supported by another decision of the Italian Supreme Court 
of Cassation (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, Division VI, Bisignani Case – 
Decision No. 254865, of 27 November 2012), did not remain without further 
development. Thus, the court recognised the necessity of obtaining a permit 
from the prosecutor to conduct such a private action [26, 92]; 
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 c) the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation identified the case where the use of 
the Trojan programme should be considered “invasive and unlawful” (Italian 
Supreme Court of Cassation, Division VI, Musumeci Case – Decision No. 27100, 
of 26 May 2015) [11, 47]. This inadmissible interference occurs when the Trojan 
program collects not the information that is already stored on the media, but 
the information that is generated on-line and can be captured by the informa-
tion system (for example, by activating the microphone or video camera of 
the device, recording the data input by the user); 
 d) the given categorical conclusion, at the same time, is not absolute. The court 
recognised the lawful use of Trojan programmes in the way described above 
without obtaining prior judicial authorization only in the course of an investiga-
tion of terrorism or organized crime (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, Joint 
Sessions, Scurato Case – Decision No. 1 July 2016) [11, 48].
Thus, being irregularly normative, the issue of using Trojans in the criminal pro-
cess in Italy is solved as follows: online search [26, 92] of the information stored is legal 
and can be carried out subject to the minimum warranty – receiving a permission from 
the prosecutor, while online surveillance [26, 92] with the information obtaining that is 
being transmitted or only being formed, requires a prior judicial authorisation, the lack of 
which is justified only in the course of the investigation of “serious criminal activity” [16].
Experience of the Baltic states
The Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania (Baudžiamojo pro-
ceso kodekso) [6] (hereinafter – the LitCCP) and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 
the Republic of Estonia (Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik) [4] (hereinafter – the ECCP) 
contain no special principles or rules for collecting evidence from electronic media. 3 At 
the same time, the legislation of the Baltic States differently solves the issue of the affili-
ation of electronic evidence to types of procedural sources. According to the LitCCP, 
electronic evidence can be qualified as documents (cl. 4 Part 1 Art. 96 of the LitCCP). 
The ECCP provides a non-exhaustive list of evidence sources, including lists and infor-
mation from electronic media (videos of secret activities, movies and other data records) 
(Sec. 63 of the ECCP) [4]. According to the ECCP, it can generally be concluded from 
case law and legal commentary that evidence in digital form is accepted in courts like 
any “tangible” evidence [22, 109].
In contrast to the above mentioned, the Code of Criminal Procedure of Latvia 
(Kriminālprocesa likums) [5] (hereinafter – the LatCCP) establishes electronic evidence 
 3 In Estonia, this feature is criticised by scientists [See Osula, A.-M., Zoetekouw, M. (2017). 
The Notification Requirement in Transborder Remote Search and Seizure: Domestic and Inter-
national Law Perspectives. Masaryk U.J.L. & Tech. 11 (1) 103, p.109. Available from: https://doi.
org/10.5817/MUJLT2017-1-6 [Accessed 29 November 2018].
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as a separate source (Art. 136 of the LatCCP) (as the other “classical” evidence: testi-
mony, physical evidence, documents, etc.). Meanwhile, the Latvian science has suggested 
the possibility of using electronic data only with electronic media – physical evidence 
and/or expert opinion drawn up as a result of their research. According to scientists, if 
the direct study of physical evidence is not possible, electronic evidence can only be used 
as indirect, and only if it is confirmed by other means of proof [24, 61].
Proceeding to the study of secret investigative actions, in particular, the LatCCP 
assumes the following: 1) granting access to information that is processed, stored or 
transmitted by the electronic information system (upon request, without the possibility 
of the media seizure) (Art. 190 of the LatCCP); 2) a provisional action is imposing on 
the information disposer the obligation to keep it unchanged, ensuring its inaccessibility 
for third parties for up to 30 days (Art. 191 of the LatCCP); 3) the request for information 
stored in accordance with Art. 191 (Art. 192 of the LatCCP) [5].
The LitCCP establishes slightly different tools. They consist, among other things, 
of the following investigative actions: 1) access of the prosecutor to information (Art. 155) 
is a familiarsation with the information content and its copying carried out on the basis 
of a prosecutor decision made with the consent of the preliminary proceeding judge 4; 
2) inspection with the use of technical means (Part 2 Art. 205 of the LitCCP), which 
may be carried out not only at the site of the object’s detection, but also in the most 
suitable place for this (from a technical point of view); 3) photographing, video shooting 
of the accused and other persons at the decision of the prosecutor for the formation of 
forensic card files (Art. 156 of the LitCCP) [6].
In the criminal proceedings in Estonia, electronic media are obtained as a result 
of the seizure (Sec. 142) during the search (Sec. 91 of the ECCP). Electronic data are 
obtained as a result of the search (Sec. 83, 86 of the ECCP) or examination (Sec. 95-109-1 
of the ECCP) of the seized media [19, 115]. At the same time, the possibility of conducting 
an electronic search in Estonian legislation, doctrine and practice is resolved ambigu-
ously. Based on the provisions of Sec. 91 of the ECCP, the possibility of electronic media 
seizure during the search is indisputable. At the same time, according to Anna-Maria 
Osula and Mark Zoetekouw, the right of the investigating authority to carry out a search 
of the electronic media, guided only by the requirements of Sec. 91 of the ECCP (general 
rules of search), is quite controversial. However, according to the scientists, it is pos-
sible to explore the inner content of electronic media with a combination of investiga-
tion – a search (Sec. 91) and the aforementioned inspection (Sec. 83, 86 of the ECCP). At 
the same time, the combination itself contains variants: the electronic medium detected 
during the search is inspected immediately; the electronic medium detected during 
the search is seized, and its examination is carried out later [22, 109–110]. However, 
 4 It is noteworthy that a fine (Part 2 of Art. 155 of the CCP of Lithuania) would be a consequence of 
the failure of the administrators to grant access to information, similarly to the CCP of France and 
unlike the CCP of Latvia (Part 2 of Art.190).
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the combination described above is not without disadvantages. As E. Laurits rightly points 
out, an “electronic media search” in the form of the inspection threatens unrestricted 
interference with privacy. The reasons for this are: unlimited inspection time; conduc-
tion without a special permission of a prosecutor or a judge; as a result, there is a lack 
of grounds substantiation for inspection; the unlimited amount of information that is 
being inspected [18, 87–88]. 
Considering the tools of secret investigative actions; in the criminal proceedings 
of Latvia, for the secret obtaining of information in electronic form the following actions 
may be carried out: 1)control of telecommunication networks (Art. 218 of the LatCCP); 
2)control of the information stored (Art. 219 of the LatCCP); 3) control of the information 
transmitted (Art. 220 of the LatCCP). 
Particular attention is drawn to the Latvian version of the stored information con-
trol. Such secret action allows1) to carry out not only the secret search of the information 
system (i.e. the search and seizure of stored information), but also the collection of data 
from the environment (“datu vides”) (similar to the Italian version of online surveillance 
[5]; 2) to delete the data without the knowledge of their owner (Part 1 of Art. 219 of 
the LatCCP); 3) to access another information system in Latvia without a special judicial 
authorisation (Part 2 of this Art.). 5
In the procedural law of Lithuania, a secret investigative action such as the con-
trol of information transmitted by telecommunication networks is peculiar (Art. 144 
of the LitCCP). Such a means of secret collection of evidence may be conducted during 
an investigation not only of “serious criminal activity”, but also of minor crimes, the list 
of which is exhaustive. In addition, the control of communicative information is carried 
out with the risk of applying to the victim of violence, coercion or other unlawful influ-
ence, to other participants in the process or their close relatives [6].
We will try to study the most vivid aspects of the secret investigative actions in 
the criminal process of Estonia from the point of view of enforcement. To do this, we 
will consider two problems. The first one is related to the procedural order for access 
to the remote information system. The ECCP provides for the possibility of obtaining 
evidence from the territory of other states in the framework of international cooperation, 
which at present is in the form of mutual legal assistance (Sec. 65). At the same time, 
law enforcement practice of Estonia recognises as lawful the evidence obtaining from 
the territory of another state without sending a request for legal assistance in case when 
there is an access to the existing virtual servers of foreign countries. The law enforcement 
bodies think as follows, “an action (the copying of data) is performed in the territory 
of Estonia by an Estonian body conducting proceedings, and the data can be received 
without physically leaving the territory of Estonia; and Estonia has the jurisdiction to 
copy the data” [19, 118]. 
 5 The last procedural possibility resembles a remote digital survey in accordance with § 110 of the CCP 
of Germany.
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The second problem is connected with the limits of establishment of corres-
pondence legal protection, in particular, in the context of electronic communications. 
Addressing the latter linked to the resolution of two key issues: (1) whether the modern 
means of electronic communication are under the correspondence protection; (2) whether 
the privacy expands to the correspondence received by the addressee [[19, 118]. According 
to the position of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia, modern means of com-
munication belong to correspondence in the context of the mentioned constitutional 
guarantee (i.e. the answer to the first question is positive), whereas the privacy ceases to 
exist after receiving the message by the addressee (i.e. the answer to the second question 
is negative). 6
Discussion
The study of experience of the abovementioned European states provides an oppor-
tunity to distinguish the following main trends:
 a) the effectiveness of the mechanism for obtaining a large mass of information in 
electronic form is primarily ensured by a qualitative legal regulation of activities 
of telecommunication services’ providers. Such regulation requires consolida-
tion of classification of information; degrees of its protection; algorithms for 
collection and storage of information; interaction of providers with law enforce-
ment agencies;
 b) procedural requirements concerning the following are guarantees of observance 
of human rights: severity of the criminal offense under investigation; necessity 
of obtaining a permit of the prosecutor or court for conducting the relevant 
investigative action;
 c) traditional procedural immunities (witness, defender) remain valid for infor-
mation in electronic form (France, Federal Republic of Germany). The form of 
information does not reduce the scope of legal protection of its content; there-
fore, it is possible to talk about the “electronic (digital) immunity” of categories 
of individuals traditionally entitled to the right to remain silent.
These trends should be taken into account by the rule-makers of those countries 
where they have not yet found their formalisation.
The research revealed a number of controversial issues:
 a) lack of unity in the European space in the matter of determining the place of 
electronic evidence in the system of other evidence (in some states they are 
identified as a separate source of evidence (Latvia); in others, they are related to 
physical evidence (Federal Republic of Germany, Estonia) or documents (Italy, 
Lithuania). However, the terminology itself is not decisive. Determinants of 
 6 For further information see Decision of the Estonian Supreme Court Criminal Chamber dated 
30 June 30 2014, No. 3-1-1-14-14; § 816–817.
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effectiveness are the accuracy and consistency of legal provisions (including 
terminology), devoted to the regulation of certain procedural actions, and their 
adaptation to the specifics of electronic information;
 b) existence of various ways of electronic data protecting: extension of the right 
to privacy in its traditional sense (France); justification of the special right to 
guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of information technology systems 
(Federal Republic of Germany). Both approaches are acceptable, but the disad-
vantage of the first one is the need for normative clarification or the application 
of a dynamic method of law interpretation;
 c) contrast of approaches to the question of maintaining the status of “correspond-
ence” by electronic messages already received by the addressee: from an affirma-
tive response in the doctrine of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic 
of Germany to the negative one in the practice of the Supreme Court of Estonia. 
In our opinion, the first of these approaches is more acceptable, since, firstly, it 
is aimed at extending the scope of the legal guarantee, and secondly, it is con-
sistent with the logic of the protection of not the “location” (telecommunication 
network or carrier), but the content of information;
 d) uncertainty about the limits of privacy in conducting investigative actions aimed 
at obtaining electronic evidence. One of the most striking aspects was the ques-
tion of the adaptability of traditional investigative actions. The mentioned issue 
arose the most acutely in Estonian legal reality, where it was problematic to 
apply the general rules of inspection and search in the investigation of an elec-
tronic medium (without a generally accepted guarantee, a prior permission, 
which should set the limits of intervention). Therefore, the development of 
a special type of inspection or search, adapted for information in electronic 
form, deserves to be supported. The normative basis for such an action should 
be to ensure a reasonable balance of human rights (prior authorization to 
determine the exact limits of intervention) and the effectiveness of the pre-trial 
investigation (the possibility of urgent conduct with the subsequent application 
for permission). Another important aspect was the validity of data obtained 
with the help of virus software (Trojan programmes). The “secret” aspect of 
the problem is: regulatory uncertainty (Italy) or regulation not in the proce-
dural law (Federal Republic of Germany), which gives rise to well-founded 
doubts about the admissibility of evidence; the possibility of deleting stored 
data without the knowledge of their owner 7 (Latvia);
 7 Without excluding the expediency of such a power as a preventive measure (for example, in order to 
prevent a crime from using stored information), we cannot agree with the presence of a similar inte-
rest in the evidence activity. If the information is relevant for the investigation, i.e. it is an evidence, 
then there is no sense in its removal; if it does not have such significance, then the investigating 
authority has no legal basis for any actions with it.
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 e) openness of the question of “electronic extra-territoriality” (Latvia, Estonia), in 
particular the possibility for the state to receive information from servers located 
in other states in the presence of virtual access to them without the involvement 
of international instruments of criminal procedural cooperation. The problem 
is that the mechanisms introduced by the bilateral agreements, due to their 
complexity and duration, are ineffective with regard to electronic evidence, 
and the unified European procedure is currently only being developed [see 23]. 
At the same time, procedural mechanisms should not violate the “electronic” 
sovereignty of the state. Because of this, the most promising is the unification 
of procedures for obtaining electronic evidence that should ensure the balance 
of the effectiveness and inviolability of the state’s sovereignty.
Conclusions
The legal status of information from electronic media in the system of evidence 
sources in the legislation of France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Estonia varies: from the attribution of documents or physical evidence to tradi-
tional sources, to identification as an independent one. In view of the unique nature of 
electronic evidence, their identification as a separate procedural source is not capable 
of ensuring the effectiveness of the investigation and its compliance with human rights 
standards. On the one hand, electronic evidence is already included in the criminal 
proceeding system with all the consequences of this (the spread of immunities, legal 
guarantees, etc.), which requires the adaptation of traditional rules to new conditions. 
On the other hand, electronic evidence has its own specifics, ignoring of which can 
cancel the results of its collection, that, in its turn, requires “normative novelty”. Both 
components should be taken into account when developing procedural mechanisms 
for collecting information in electronic form. The tools of public and secret procedural 
measures for obtaining evidence, fixed in foreign codes, are characterised by variation in 
the content of actions with uniform procedural guarantees. At the same time, the lack of 
unified international procedures leads to problems when collecting electronic evidence 
from the territory of other states. The current state of the development of information 
technology requires the implementation of unified and rapid measures not only within 
a separate part of the world, as the boundaries and distances of information are not of 
particular importance for the movement of information. This also can become a prom-
ising area for further research.
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Elektronisko mediju informācijas izmantošana 
daudzu Eiropas valstu kriminālprocedūrā: 
salīdzinošā juridiskā pētniecība
Kopsavilkums
Reglamentētie pierādījumu avoti un procesuālie rīki to saņemšanai vairs nevar 
ignorēt milzīgo elektronisko datu daudzumu, kas satur unikālu informāciju noziegumu 
atklāšanai. Tajā pašā laikā katra tiesību sistēma dažādos veidos pielāgojas mūsdienu apstāk-
ļiem. Ņemot vērā tiesību sistēmu elementu līdzību rumāņu-ģermāņu (kontinentālajā) juri-
diskajā saimē, tai piederošo valstu salīdzinošais juridiskais pētījums ir īpaši vērtīgs. Tāpēc 
salīdzinošajai juridiskajai analīzei tika izvēlētas sešu Eiropas valstu (Francijas, Vācijas 
Federatīvās Republikas, Itālijas, Igaunijas, Latvijas un Lietuvas) tiesību sistēmas. Ārvalstu 
pieredzes pētījums tika veikts noteiktā secībā: tiesiskais regulējums; elektronisko pierādī-
jumu vieta pierādījumu avotu sistēmā; cilvēktiesību un brīvību ievērošanas problemātiskie 
jautājumi; publiskas un slepenas izmeklēšanas darbības, kas var sniegt elektronisku pie-
rādījumu iegūšanu. Tika secināts, ka no elektroniskajiem plašsaziņas līdzekļiem iegūtās 
informācijas juridiskais statuss pierādījumu avotu sistēmā iepriekš minēto sešu valstu 
tiesību aktos ir atšķirīgs. No vienas puses, elektroniskie pierādījumi jau ir iekļauti krimināl-
procesa sistēmā (ar visām no tā izrietošajām sekām – imunitātes izplatību, tiesiskajām 
garantijām utt.), kurai ir jāpielāgo tradicionālie noteikumi jauniem nosacījumiem. No 
otras puses, elektroniskajiem pierādījumiem ir sava specifika, kuras ignorēšana var atcelt 
to vākšanas rezultātus, kuriem savukārt ir nepieciešami jauni normatīvi. Tiek uzsvērts, ka, 
izstrādājot procesuālus mehānismus informācijas vākšanai elektroniskā formā, ir jāņem 
vērā abi aspekti. Nobeigumā tiek secināts, ka vienotu starptautisku procedūru trūkums 
rada problēmas, vācot elektroniskus pierādījumus no citu valstu teritorijas.
Atslēgvārdi: salīdzinošais kriminālprocess, elektroniskie pierādījumi, elektroniskā 
informācija, izmeklēšanas darbības.
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